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1 Introduction
The 23rd Conference of the parties (COP 23) to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) was held in Bonn between 6–17
November 2017 under the presidency of Fiji. The con-
ference focused in particular on developing rules to 
implement the Paris Agreement and on raising ambition 
for climate protection. Since this was the first ‘Oceanic’
COP, special attention was also given to supporting the
countries of the Global South in their efforts to reduce
emissions, adapt to climate change and deal with the
unavoidable impacts of climate change to which adaptation
is no longer possible.
2017 has been marked by extreme weather-related 
disasters. These ranged from a series of devastating hurri-
canes in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico to severe
flooding in South Asia to catastrophic drought and exten-
sive forest fires in Portugal. There was little sense of this in
the negotiations, however, apart from the warnings issued
by Fiji and other vulnerable countries. Nobody took over
the reins of leadership, which the US had dropped follow-
ing the change in administration. On the positive side, fears1
that the US under its new administration might sabotage
proceedings did not materialise: the US delegation was
extremely small and kept a low profile.
Nevertheless, the change of administration in the US
has left a vacuum in leadership, which was neither filled by
the European Union (EU) nor by China. The EU was too
preoccupied with its own affairs, Germany was disoriented
owing to post-election negotiations and bound by its 
in-between role of being organiser of the COP while not
having the presidency, and France lacked the power to lead,
despite an impressive performance by President Macron.
Also, although the People’s Republic of China showed 
leadership among the group of middle-income nations, it
primarily used this role to pursue its own interests, without
focusing on the bigger picture.
As a result of this lack of political leadership, only the
‘obligatory’ part of the programme was fulfilled at COP 23:
although some progress was made in terms of technical
details, the diplomats’ work in preparation for the decisive
Climate Change Conference in Poland in December 2018
was not facilitated as much as had been hoped for. The
‘Talanoa dialogue’, which the Fijian presidency got off the
ground, is a ray of hope. It is a discussion process to take
stock of the current level of effort that will last all year
under the leadership of Fiji and Poland. It is unclear, 
however, in which way the results of this process will find
their way into the negotiating texts.
The most important events of COP 23 probably took
place outside of the diplomatic arena: one such event 
was an impressive appearance by the ‘other America’, a 
US-American alliance of states, cities, corporations and 
initiatives, which intends to compensate for Donald Trump’s
announced withdrawal from the Paris Agreement by 
introducing their own climate protection measures.
Another example was the foundation of an alliance to
phase out coal, founded by around 20 countries (along
with a few US states and individual Canadian provinces).
The following analysis sums up the main developments
and results of the conference.
2 A weak tailwind behind the rule book
One of the key objectives of the Bonn conference was to
push ahead negotiations on the rules for implementing 
the Paris Agreement. The aim was to enable their adoption
at the next Climate Change Conference in Katowice
(Poland) in December 2018. The Paris Agreement only
establishes the objectives and basic mechanisms of interna-
tional climate policy after 2020, but the precise rules of
how to implement the agreement have not been formu-
lated yet, eg how the countries are supposed to report on
the actual realisation of their contributions in order to
ensure comparability of the various efforts made.2 The
Paris conference had established a dedicated subsidiary
body for this purpose, the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
the Paris Agreement (APA). The requirement of the Bonn
conference was to agree an initial negotiating text for the
rule book as a basis for further negotiations next year. 
This requirement was only fulfilled in part.
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2.1 Guidelines for national contributions
In the run-up to Paris, it had not been possible to agree 
on stringent guidelines for the content of the nationally
determined contributions (NDCs), ie the national climate
plans submitted under the Paris Agreement. The NDCs
therefore differ considerably in their approach and are
barely comparable. Part of the negotiations regarding the
rule book is therefore to agree on stricter guidelines for
future NDCs.
Negotiations on this matter got stuck very early on in
the negotiations because the parties had strongly differing
views on both the scope of the guidelines themselves and
on the level of differentiation between developed and
developing countries’ NDCs. Especially the latter issue 
was discussed widely, with developed countries warning
against a process of ‘bifurcation’ within NDCs. While 
they recognised that there would have to be a degree of
differentiation in the level of detail of NDCs, the general
approach should in their view be similar. On the scope of
the guidelines, the parties were divided on how detailed
guidelines could be so as to not allow for ‘shaming’ of 
countries, but also to not be so general that they would 
be rendered useless.
The co-facilitators tried to reconcile countries’ positions
in a one-page paper that only included headlines for
caveats, general approach and procedural aspects, as well 
as preliminary material to develop further substance on
the issue. However, that approach was not endorsed by 
the negotiating the parties. Another document proposed
by the co-facilitators contained 45 pages of preliminary
material on the three main topics (features of NDCs, 
information to be provided by countries and accounting) 
in the form of the different options proposed, but again 
the parties could not find a way forward to streamline the
document into a negotiating text. The end result of the
conference was a text with more than 180 pages reflecting
all countries’ views giving different alternative options, 
containing numerous duplications and redundancies. That
text was then forwarded as the co-facilitators’ informal
note to the next meeting (APA 1-4), with a view that after-
wards the co-facilitators would endeavour to streamline
the text for further negotiations at APA 1-5.3
2.2 Adaptation communication
According to the Paris Agreement, the parties should 
‘submit and update periodically an adaptation communi-
cation, which may include its priorities, implementation 
and support needs, plans and actions’.4 As for national 
contributions, however, so far there is no guidance for 
these communications, thus impeding comparison and
aggregation of information provided to assess plans for 
and progress in global adaptation efforts. In Bonn, informal
consultations on this agenda item resulted in an informal
note by the co-facilitators. On 10 pages, a preliminary 
basic structure for further guidance for adaptation com-
munications is outlined as a possible basis for further 
work. The document already contains options for headings,
subheadings and content. However, so far, there has not
been agreement on any text yet.
2.3 The transparency framework
The ‘enhanced transparency framework for action and 
support’5 is considered a cornerstone of the Paris
Agreement. It is to inform policy-makers at national and
international levels on the design and implementation of
climate change mitigation, adaptation and support policies
while at the same time providing the basis for the global
stocktake (see section 2.6). As its name indicates, the
framework is to provide transparency on two issues: 
mitigation and adaption actions (transparency of action), 
as well as support provided and received (transparency of
support).
In Bonn, the parties in the APA negotiations had the
challenging task to further specify the generic provisions
from the Paris Agreement in order to allow for the 
adoption of common modalities, procedures and guidelines
(the so-called MPGs) by the end of 2018.
With regard to transparency of action, the Paris
Agreement mandates that all the parties ‘shall’ provide
national inventory reports and submit information that
allows tracking the progress towards NDC achievement.
the parties ‘should’ fur ther provide information on 
climate change related impacts and adaptation. the parties’
reports on mitigation action and support are to undergo a
technical expert review which is also to indicate potential
room for improvement. Adaptation reports, in contrast,
will not be part of this international assessment.6 These
provisions are applicable to all of the parties, as the Paris
Agreement does not in principle differentiate between
developing and developed countries. However, the parties
in Paris had agreed that ‘[t]he transparency framework 
shall provide flexibility… to those developing country the
parties that need it in the light of their capacities’ (Article
13.2 of the Paris Agreement).
With the question of how to integrate the flexibility
provisions into the enhanced transparency framework, the
issue of differentiation became the key point of contention
in Bonn. The positions expressed in the negotiations 
largely reflected the parties’ views from a round of sub-
missions held prior to COP 23, where regarding most 
submissions of developing counties the parties (with the
exception of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS))
called for the MPGs to differentiate clearly between 
developed and developing countries, allowing the latter 
to determine by themselves the need for flexibility.7
Some developed countries, in contrast, in Bonn emphasised
the need to have common MPGs for all the parties.
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Differentiation in their view should be mainly limited to 
the area of support, where developing countries are not
strictly required to report on support provided while
reporting on support needed and received is limited to
developing countries, in line with Articles 13.9 and 13.10 
of the Paris Agreement.8
The co-facilitators tried to compile the different views
on the application of provisions to different countries in
one document. However, abbreviation of the text had 
led to mistakes, confusion and calls for its further im-
provement.9 In spite of these difficulties and the political
controversies surrounding the question of differentiation,
the parties were in the end able to agree on a document.
This relatively concise document10 will be used as a basis
for discussion in the process of further negotiations. The
parties in Bonn, however, were not able significantly to
reduce the number of possible formulations and options
for the future transparency framework. It can be expected
that the design of the transparency rules will still provide
plenty of issues to discuss in the run-up to the forth-
coming negotiations in Katowice.
2.4 Cooperative mechanisms under Article 6
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement comprises three
approaches for cooperation between countries: ‘coopera-
tive approaches’ under Article 6.2, a new mechanism to
promote mitigation and sustainable development (‘sustain-
able development mechanism’, Article 6.4–6.7), and a
framework for non-market approaches (Article 6.8 and
6.9). However, so far there is little clarity on how these
approaches are supposed to function.
The 45th Session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific
and Technological Advice (SBSTA 45) in Marrakech in 
2016 had invited the parties to submit their views on 
operationalising Article 6 by March 2017, a move which
was repeated at the end of the 46th SBSTA meeting in
June 2017 in Bonn, calling on the parties to provide input
in the run-up to COP 23.11 While this approach reflected
the degree of persisting divergence between the parties,
these iterations laid the foundation for an intensive round
of talks at and before the Bonn/Fiji COP in November
2017.
The stated goal of the co-facilitators was to give inputs
by the parties a logical order and structure them, so that 
in the end a list of all issues could be produced which
would be endorsed by all of the parties. Yet during the 
discussions it turned out that divergence on many issues
was still substantial. These cover basic topics such as 
scope and governance for Article 6.2, the types of activities
eligible for Article 6.4 and how to ensure environmental
integrity. Controversial issues are, for example, how to
ensure that Article 6 does not support activities which
would have taken place anyhow (additionality) and how
the fact that all the parties now have taken on commit-
ments relates to this issue.
On Tuesday in the second week of the COP three 
long informal documents with a number of headers, sub
headers and possible elements emerged, covering many
duplications and in desperate need for sequencing and
restructuring. The final SBSTA conclusions12 request the
SBSTA chair to produce draft negotiation texts based on
the work done in Bonn and on the previous submissions
by the parties until the next SBSTA session. This will enable
the co-facilitators to produce a fresh, consolidated draft
text, so that the parties have the opportunity to start 
discussing substance, provided that no major controversies
re-emerge on structure and elements. Nonetheless, there
is a great deal of work ahead and the co-facilitators’ task of
realigning and consolidating the text will be a difficult and
delicate exercise. Thus, it could well be that the Katowice
COP is going to focus on ‘core elements’ of the Article 6
rule book, as suggested by the EU, and shelving technical
issues for later consideration.
On a different note, what remains unclear for the time
being is the question of who is going to use Article 6 in
practice. Within the EU, the traditional core source of
demand for emission reduction units, only a small number
of states consider making use of Article 6. While Canada
and New Zealand continue to push solutions for market-
based cooperation, the majority of the parties mentioning
Article 6 in their NDCs are actually potential supplier
countries, pointing to a substantial market imbalance for
possible Article 6 cooperation.
2.5 Compliance
Article 15 of the Paris Agreement establishes a compliance
mechanism which aims to promote the parties’ imple-
mentation of and compliance with its provisions. The
Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the
Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) as the agree-
ment’s highest body is called upon to adopt the necessary
modalities and procedures for its operation. The APA 
has a mandate to develop these rules. In Paris, it had
already been decided that the committee overseeing 
the mechanism should consist of 12 members with 
recognized competence in relevant scientific, technical,
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socio-economic or legal fields, to be elected by the CMA
on the basis of equitable geographical representation, with
two members each from the five regional groups of the
UN and one member each from small island developing
states (SIDS) and least developed countries (LDCs), while
taking into account the goal of gender balance.
The conference in Bonn made little headway in terms
of clarifying the way forward. In line with the treatment of
other issues in the APA, the group decided to support the
development of an ‘informal note’. However, on all of the
four main points of discussion, namely principles, systemic
issues, linkages to other bodies and functions, the parties
were unable to come together and agree on how the
mechanism should take shape. While there is general
agreement that the procedure should be ‘facilitative, 
transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive’ (Article 15.2
of the Paris Agreement), there are divergent views as to
whether the Committee should have a more active role,
should receive information directly or through other 
bodies and whether it should be able to define its own
rules. In the end, the Committee presented a compilation
of views in a ‘revised informal note’ documenting the 
arguments made by the parties.
Looking forward to COP 24 in 2019, it appears unclear
whether or not crucial aspects will be effectively addressed,
such as how the compliance mechanism will be triggered
and the kind of results expected. As with most other
issues, COP 23 merely resulted in the exchange and 
documentation of the many divergent views. A successful
finalisation of a compliance procedure will depend on 
political leadership on this and other areas.
2.6 Global stocktake
The nationally determined contributions that have been
announced so far are clearly too low to keep the rise 
in temperature under 2°C: even if all the parties were 
actually to deliver on their commitments to their full
extent, the expected increase in global mean temperature
would be more than 3°C. This is why discussions under the
Paris Agreement are scheduled to take place every five
years on how much progress the global efforts have made
and how they can be intensified. After this stocktake, 
the parties are supposed to announce new increased 
contributions. The rule book needs to clarify how this
stocktake is to be carried out in concrete terms.
In Bonn, the delegates discussed ‘building blocks’ of 
the discussion process.13 There were differences of opinion
on whether the process should be organised using the
existing subsidiary bodies, or whether to establish a 
dedicated subsidiary body. There were also controversies
on whether the process should take less or more than a
year. The negotiators envisaged a preparatory, a technical
and a political phase. The preparatory phase is to collect
inputs, the technical phase is to assess these inputs in a
series of dialogues and workshops, and the political phase
is to produce the final outcome. Inputs are envisaged to be
compiled by the subsidiary bodies and/or the Secretariat,
followed by identification of potential information gaps and
calls for additional input.
Notably, negotiators devoted significant amounts of
time to the question of how to include equity considera-
tions in the stocktake, including through dedicated tech-
nical dialogues and calls for inputs. Equity has so far been
one of the most intractable issues in the negotiations, with
most countries cherry picking criteria of equity (such as
historical versus future emissions), which would shift most
of the perceived burden of reducing emissions to other
countries. In Bonn, several countries noted that equity was
not only about sharing costs, but also about sharing the
benefits of climate action.
Many countries were keen to reaffirm that the stock-
take will only ‘inform’ the preparation of future NDCs.
Contributions are to continue being nationally determined;
the international process is not to create any compulsion
of any kind as to their substance.
2.7 Outlook
Overall, the conference in Bonn did not set the scene 
particularly well for COP 24 in Katowice. On the contrary,
in 2018 there will still be substantial work to do in order 
to produce the text in a form that is ready for adoption.
The prospects for the effective implementation of the 
Paris Agreement therefore remain uncertain, especially
since the next climate change negotiations in Katowice will
be held under the Polish presidency. The Polish govern-
ment shows little ambition in terms of climate policy, and
many observers therefore fear that the next summit will
take place under more difficult conditions. Thus, everything
must be done over the next few months under the Fijian
presidency to prepare the decisions for Katowice in the
best possible way. The Bonn conference has already noted
that an additional preparatory meeting may be necessary
in 2018.
3 In the slipstream: little solidarity with
the Global South
Although, geographically, Bonn was the venue for the 
conference, the host in terms of content was Fiji.
Therefore, topics that are of great relevance to the 
developing countries in general and small island states in
particular were prominently discussed at this ‘Pacific’ or
‘Oceanic’ COP.
3.1 Loss and damage
The last year saw multiple headlines about devastation
caused by extreme weather events. With Fiji holding the
COP presidency, the expectations were particularly high
regarding progress in the area of impacts of climate change
where adaptation is no longer possible. These impacts,
referred to as loss and damage, range from deaths during
hurricanes to the loss of settlement areas owing to sea
level rise.
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The topic of loss and damage was recognised as 
the third pillar of necessary climate actions in the Paris
Agreement, along with emission reductions and adapta-
tion to climate change. Nevertheless, it is being nego-
tiated in a separate, rather technical UNFCCC workstream
to the Paris Agreement under the Warsaw International
Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM). The WIM 
is to study impacts and provide support to victims 
and governments of vulnerable developing country 
parties.
In Bonn, an ongoing five-year work plan was agreed for
the WIM, which aims at achieving an increase in active
knowledge sharing. The final text highlighted the impor-
tance of loss and damage, noting the parties’ concerns 
‘on the increasing frequency and severity of climate-related
disasters’.14 This text was finally included against strong
resistance by, in particular, Australia and the USA. However,
the final text is lacking significant specifics developing 
countries had hoped for, such as decisions on the extent 
to which each country should address the prevention and
handling of loss and damage.
Financing for loss and damage remains a highly con-
tentious issue in the negotiations. While the COP decision
adopting the Paris Agreement states that the inclusion 
of loss and damage in the Paris Agreement ‘does not
involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensa-
tion’,15 the COP decision establishing the WIM names
‘enhancing action and support, including finance’16 as one 
of the WIM’s functions and the Paris Agreement states 
that the parties ‘should enhance … support … on a 
cooperative and facilitative basis with respect to loss and
damage’.17 Nevertheless, in Bonn, even for the work of 
the WIM Executive Committee, the parties were only
encouraged ‘to make available sufficient resources’,18 while
further financing for loss and damage has not even been
negotiated. Also, financing for any potential insurance 
protection against climate-related damage remained an
unanswered question in Bonn. An expert group on action
and support called for by the G77 plus China could not 
be established owing to heavy resistance by industrialised
countries.
Raising the importance of loss and damage in the 
negotiations is a key issue for developing countries. Thus, 
at COP 23, LDCs and the AOSIS repeated previous calls 
of the G77 plus China to include loss and damage as 
a permanent agenda item in the biannual negotiations 
of the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs). Instead of an annual review
of the report of the WIM’s Executive Committee, negotia-
tions under the SBs would take place all year long. In
essence, negotiations under the SBs would move the 
issue of loss and damage from the technical to the 
political sphere, as the technical work of the SBs prepares
political agreements in the UNFCCC negotiations.
Industrialised country parties, however, dismissed this call
out of fear of the installation of a forum for compensation
claims.
In the end, the parties compromised on convening an
expert dialogue at the next sessions of the SBs in May
2018 which will address the question of support in the
handling of loss and damage. This dialogue will also tackle
the issue of financing. Its outcome will feed into the 
review of the WIM, which is scheduled for 2019 and may
become important because the WIM is to serve the Paris
Agreement after 2020. Furthermore, a task force on dis-
placement will prepare recommendations with a view to
averting, minimising and addressing both cross-border and
internal displacement related to the negative impacts of 
climate change. Finally, COP 23 saw the launch of the 
Fiji clearing house for risk transfers and the UNFCCC
repository of information on insurance and risk transfer, as
well as the launch of the InsuRelience Global Partnership,
which is to bring affordable insurance to millions of 
vulnerable people around the world. However, these 
initiatives can only be part of the puzzle regarding the 
handling of loss and damage.
3.2 Financing
How ambitious climate protection measures can be
financed worldwide has been a hotly contested issue for
years – and it came up again in Bonn, with unexpected
severity. One crucial question is what really applies as 
climate financing and how to report both the level of
resources provided by developed countries and their use
in developing countries. As expected, no decisions were
made in this regard.
However, an important decision on the future archi-
tecture of international climate financing was made in
Bonn. The Adaptation Fund, originally set up under the
Kyoto Protocol, will also come under the umbrella of the
Paris Agreement in the future. The dispute about this was
only resolved long into the last night of the conference.
This means that the continued existence of this important
fund is secured in the future. However, the sources that are
to contribute to the fund in the future remain unclear. 
As the proceeds from the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) have all but come to a standstill, the Adaptation
Fund has had to rely on voluntary contributions from
developed countries for years.
This year, Germany has already pledged €50 million for
both the Adaptation Fund and the Least Developed
Countries Fund respectively on the first day of the 
conference, followed by Sweden with an additional €18.7
million for each of the two funding mechanisms, with
Belgium pledging a further €10.25 million for the Least
Developed Countries Fund.
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4 Under steam: reinforcing climate 
protection efforts
4.1 Climate protection before 2020
The negotiation mandate agreed at the United Nations
Climate Change Conference in Durban in 2011 involved
two negotiation tracks: first, the negotiation of a com-
prehensive agreement for the period after 2020, which 
was concluded with the adoption of the Paris Agreement
in 2015 and, secondly, achieving an increase in efforts, 
especially on the part of the developed countries, for 
the period up to 2020. This negotiation process has not
delivered any tangible results so far. A number of technical
expert meetings were held in the context of a technical
examination process, which examined the reduction
potentials and policy options available for several sectors.
This process delivered valuable analytical results. However,
there were no visible, specific reinforcements of efforts 
on the part of the countries.
In Bonn, the topic was at the top of the agenda again 
for a number of reasons. First, the main building block 
of the efforts to be made before 2020 has not yet come
into force, namely the Doha Amendment containing the
second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol cover-
ing the period from 2013 to 2020. In particular, the EU 
was caught in the cross-fire of criticism here, as it has not
even managed to ratify the Doha Amendment owing to
the abstention of Poland. Furthermore, the developing
countries have not seen any visible progress in the imple-
mentation of the commitment by the developed countries
to increase their financial support to at least US$100 billion
per year by 2020. Finally, developing countries complained
that there was no negotiating space in the agenda to 
discuss these concerns. They thus demanded that ‘climate
protection before 2020’ should be an agenda item in itself,
which the developed countries initially rejected.
Ultimately, however, the developed countries relented
and agreed with the developing countries to conduct two
additional dialogue processes (facilitative dialogues) on
global emission reductions and provision of support in
2018 and 2019. Furthermore, by 1 May 2018, the states 
are to submit information on the progress they have made
in increasing their efforts. The UN Climate Change
Secretariat is to prepare a synthesis report based on this
information. In addition, the parties to the Kyoto Protocol
were asked to ratify the second commitment period.19
The EU has, in the meantime, submitted its instrument of
ratification.
4.2 Stocktake and increasing efforts
In addition to the global stocktake process laid down in 
the Paris Agreement (see above), the decision adopting 
the Paris Agreement also envisaged a first review of global
efforts to take place in 2018, initially also referred to as
‘facilitative dialogue’. After the review, the states are to
announce new and increased contributions by 2020. The
Bonn conference had the task of specifying the terms on
which this review is to be carried out. As the Paris
Agreement does not come into effect until 2020, the
modalities for the facilitative dialogue were negotiated 
separately from those of the Global Stocktake. Effectively,
however, the design of the process in 2018 will set a 
precedent for the design of the Global Stocktake, which 
is to be carried out every five years from 2023.
The design of the facilitative dialogue was jointly pre-
pared by the Moroccan presidency of COP 22 and the
Fijian presidency of COP 23. One key question in the 
negotiations was the extent to which the parties were
going to commit to the process. In an early draft decision,
the parties would simply have ‘taken note of ’ the design. In
the decision finally adopted,20 the COP ‘welcomes with
appreciation’ the design of the process and ‘launches’ it.
Now renamed the ‘Talanoa Dialogue’ – named after a
Fijian term for a transparent and participatory dialogue –
the process is scheduled to start in January 2018. The 
outgoing Fijian presidency and the incoming Polish presi-
dency will preside over the dialogue together. This is
intended to defuse concerns about the lack of commit-
ment on the part of the Polish government. The Talanoa
Dialogue will be structured around three questions: 
Where are we? Where do we want to go? And how do 
we get there? First, during a ‘technical’ phase up to the end
of the year, information on these three questions will be
compiled during multiple sessions. An essential point in 
this regard is that not only states but also sub-national and
non-state stakeholders are invited to provide analytical and
policy relevant input. Another important contribution will
be the special report by the IPCC on the 1.5°C target,
which is to be published in autumn 2018. The UNFCCC
Secretariat is to establish an online platform under the
guidance of the Fijian and Polish presidencies to facilitate
access to all these inputs. Finally, the parties are to draw
conclusions at ministerial level during the ‘political phase’ at
COP 24.
The COP also decided that the outcome of the Talanoa
Dialogue will feed into the 2019 stocktake on pre-2020
ambition.21 The Talanoa Dialogue and the pre-2020 stock-
takes will thereby form an ongoing discussion process on
raising ambition.
5 Close to the wind: pioneer alliances and
non-party actors
With great fanfare, outside the formal diplomatic negotia-
tions in Bonn, the founding of an alliance to phase out coal
was announced: led by the United Kingdom and Canada,
around 20 nations (as well as individual Canadian provinces
and US states) set up the ‘Powering Past Coal Alliance’. The
member countries of the alliance have agreed to phase 
out existing traditional coal power and restrict financing 
for its future use. Fifteen EU Member States are part of the
alliance along with the United Kingdom, including France,
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Portugal, Denmark, the Netherlands and Italy. Germany is
the only major EU Member State to remain outside it so
far. By the end of the year 2017, this alliance had grown 
to include 26 countries, eight subnational governments and
24 businesses and organisations.
The formation of pioneer alliances is an essential means
of advancing the global negotiations that are based on the
consensus principle.22 Other climate clubs should follow,
for example for the promotion of renewable energies, for
adaptation to climate change or for climate protection
financing. Pioneer alliances, in which nations (and sub-
national stakeholders) join forces, bring forward new 
ideas which otherwise would have no chance against the
resistance of procrastinating states. A sectoral approach,
which breaks down the challenges associated with the
transformation of whole national economies into individual
sectors would probably be particularly valuable.23 The
Powering Past Coal Alliance is a loosely knit alliance 
without a legal basis in international law. For other alliances,
such as a genuine decarbonisation alliance, for example,
there might be a need for a firmer legal foundation.
The civil society programme in the ‘Bonn Zone’ on 
the fringe of the diplomatic negotiations was particularly
impressive. Especially positive was the strong presence of
the ‘other America’ at Bonn. The ‘We are still in’ coalition of
US states, cities, businesses and other stakeholders who
wish to remain true to the targets of the Paris Agreement,
was a major presence in Bonn. It was very clear that,
although the new US president had turned away from 
the Paris Agreement, at least half the country has not 
done so. It remains to be seen, however, whether this sub-
national, pro-Paris coalition in the United States can really
compensate for the dismantling of the national climate 
policy by the Trump administration.
The Global Climate Action Agenda (GCA) agreed 
in Paris provides the platform for a large number of 
initiatives, alliances and concrete measures. A high point of
COP 23 was the publication of the first Yearbook on
Global Climate Action. Particularly important here is 
that there is a mandate to link these non-governmental
activities more closely with the technical examination
processes within the framework of the diplomatic negotia-
tions. Early in 2018, there is supposed to be a meeting at
which further themes and the inclusion of sub-national
stakeholders will be debated. Outside of the diplomatic 
circles, a major event to organise sub-national activities 
for climate protection will take place in September 2018 
in California: a ‘Global Climate Action Summit’ hosted by
Governor Jerry Brown.
6 Frames of reference: climate protection
in a wider context
It was remarkable to note that climate protection is
increasingly seen in a wider context. A large number of side
events discussed the connections of climate protection
with gender issues, human rights, the fair treatment of
employees affected by economic restructuring (just 
transition), as well as the UN Sustainable Development
Goals. After a closer connection to these issues was 
formulated in the preamble to the Paris Agreement for 
the first time, there are now intensive discussions to decide
how these connections can be made concrete.
There was also one success in this regard in the 
diplomatic negotiations, when the conference adopted 
a Gender Action Plan (GAP). The plan recognises that 
gender-responsive climate policy ‘requires fur ther 
strengthening in all activities concerning adaptation, 
mitigation and related means of implementation … as 
well as decision-making on the implementation of climate
policies. The GAP recognizes the need for women to be
represented in all aspects of the UNFCCC process and 
the need for gender mainstreaming through all relevant 
targets and goals in activities under the Convention as an
important contribution to increasing their effectiveness’.
The plan provides for a work programme for the next 
two years, including activities on, for example, capacity
building, enhancing gender balance and policy coherence.24
However, financing for these activities relies on voluntary
contributions from the parties and is not yet secured.
The COP also strengthened the Local Communities
and Indigenous Peoples Platform, a forum for the exchange
of experiences and sharing of best practices established at
COP 21 in Paris. The respective COP decision further
specifies the functions of the platform (building and sharing
knowledge, building capacities, and integrating diverse
knowledge systems, practices and innovations in climate
policies and actions) and mandates the SBSTA with the 
further operationalisation of the platform.25
7 Other ongoing business
7.1 Finance
Apart from ongoing and often complicated negotiations 
on finance commitments and reporting thereof (see
above), this year’s round of decisions on finance was 
largely unremarkable in its outcomes. Negotiations on
finance got tangled up early because developing countries
demanded more clarity by industrialised countries about
their current and planned provision of financial and other
means of implementation, especially in the period before
2020. Industrialised countries are very hesitant to agree to
formal reporting requirements in this regard, as this would
have implications on their national budgeting processes.
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The final decision on long-term finance by the COP26
reiterates previously-made commitments of developed
countries towards increasing the volume of climate 
finance to annually US$100 billion by 2020, with the goal 
to achieve a better balance between mitigation and 
adaptation components.
Long-term finance will be taken up in 2018 through 
an in-session workshop, as well as a ministerial dialogue
organised by the COP 24 presidency with a focus on
access to finance. The pathway towards achieving the 
long-term finance goal may also be subject to discussions
under the forthcoming Biennial Assessment of climate
finance flows of the Standing Committee on Finance that is
due next year.27
7.2 Technology
Work on technology transfer continued its slow but steady
process at this COP. Under the Poznan strategic pro-
gramme on technology transfer, the Global Environment
Facility (GEF) is again invited to allocate financing in 
support of developing countries’ technology needs assess-
ments, and in piloting priority technology project in those
countries. The GEF is invited to include information in its
future reports to the COP on collaborative activities
between GEF focal points and the designated entities of
the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN).
The CTCN in its report highlighted that it had 
completed almost 30 requests for technical assistance, 
with a further pipeline of 111. The Technology Executive
Committee (TEC) reported on its work in 2017, which 
had strongly focused on adaptation in the water and 
agriculture sectors. The COP has requested both bodies
to monitor and evaluate the impacts of their respective
work, and encourages the TEC to enhance the linkages
between its work and NDC development, as well as 
adaptation planning.28
Meanwhile, the technology framework under the Paris
Agreement has not progressed beyond initial discussions
on scope and questions of linkages to the transparency
framework. The SBSTA has been requested to prepare an
initial draft of a potential technology framework by March
2018.29
7.3 Kyoto mechanisms
The deliberations on the Kyoto mechanisms CDM and JI 
at CMP 13 mirrored the dwindling importance of these
instruments, which have seen carbon prices near zero for
years owing to lack of demand. There was no decision 
with regard to guidance to Joint Implementation, and the
CDM guidance30 merely calls for the CDM Executive
Board to continue streamlining the standardized baselines
framework and keep supporting designated national
authorities in developing standardized baselines. It further
encourages the board to continue working with interna-
tional finance institutions in order to find other sources of
demand for CDM credits. Finally, the decision urges the
parties to deposit their instruments of acceptance of the
Doha Amendment. The negotiations on the reform of 
the modalities and procedures of the CDM was again 
postponed to the intersessional meeting in 2018.
8 Outlook
8.1 More wind in the run-up to Katowice?
While the Talanoa spirit was invoked again and again, in
practice many of the technical negotiations were rather
‘Talanoa-free’ zones, marked by traditional bickering among
developed and developing countries and various groups
among them.31 The Fiji-in-Bonn conference thus lost much
of that spirit which had made the Paris Agreement 
possible: the profound knowledge that all countries are 
‘in the same boat’ regarding climate change and that only 
a joint effort will suffice to avert catastrophe.
Bonn fulfilled the obligatory task to produce a docu-
ment to make an agreement on the set of rules for
Katowice possible. The quality of the documents will, how-
ever, not be particularly helpful, since they in general do 
not reflect the outcomes of negotiations but are merely
compilations of negotiation positions. Thus, the volume of
text increased to 266 pages in the course of the negotia-
tions – in fact, the central document swelled from 47 
to more than 180 pages in Bonn. Therefore, quite some
diplomatic work and political leadership will be needed
over the next year.
Even this is only the precursor to the real work, 
namely the drastic reduction of global greenhouse emis-
sions as quickly as possible. In order to keep the tempera-
ture limits of the Paris Agreement, most countries would
need to increase their climate protection contributions
massively and then implement them. However, in many
countries there is massive resistance to introducing and
implementing the necessary restructuring of national
economies.
The scope for ambitious decisions at the international
level is therefore limited. International policy can seldom
take decisions which have not previously been prepared 
at the national level. But it can play the role of a pace-
maker for national discussions by placing the subject on the
political agenda again and again and compelling national
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policy to account for its actions. The five-year cycle of
stocktaking and subsequent resubmission of nationally
determined contributions prescribed in the Paris
Agreement should precisely fulfil this function.
The first of these stocktakes is set to take place next
year with the Talanoa Dialogue. The full calendar of climate
diplomacy should contribute to keeping climate protection
in the news and high on the political agenda. In December
2017, the Bonn COP was followed by the One Climate
Summit in Paris, a conference on climate financing hosted
by the French President Macron. In 2018, there will follow
the series of events foreseen by the Talanoa Dialogue, 
the negotiating rounds of the UNFCCC in Bonn in May,
possibly a further round of negotiations in the late 
summer, and COP 24 in Katowice at the end of the year. 
In addition, September will see the publication of the IPCC
special report on the 1.5° target and the Global Climate
Action Summit, hosted by the Governor of California Jerry
Brown to further dynamise the sub-national and non-state
stakeholders. In 2019, a climate summit is to follow at the
level of heads of state and government, hosted in New 
York by UN Secretary-General António Guterres.
At the moment, process is the most important factor 
in the implementation of climate policy imperatives. It 
must be hoped that keeping the issue at the top of the
agenda for the years to come will contribute to achieving
the urgently needed increase in nationally determined 
contributions by the 2020 deadline. In Bonn, old clashes of
interest emerged, which were covered for a while by the
Paris spirit. For success in Katowice next year, it will be
essential for all countries to rediscover the central message
of the Paris Agreement: that in the face of the coming
storms on a finite planet, we are all in the same boat.
8.2 Charting the course towards higher 
ambition?
The Talanoa Dialogue has the potential to play a key role 
in 2018, but its mandate is limited. The Dialogue will not
prepare COP 24 in its entirety: it is limited to taking stock
of current efforts and trying to create momentum for
enhanced action. Negotiation of the Paris rulebook will
continue to take place within the normal diplomatic
process of the APA at its next session in May and probably
an additional session in late summer. It is thus unclear in
which ways the results and the ‘spirit’ of the Talanoa
Dialogue will find their way into the APA negotiations – and
how far they might be able to influence the outcome.
In the best of worlds, the Dialogue will send the 
message that enhancing action is urgent – and possible. 
The Dialogue should acknowledge the gap that currently
looms between the level of action that has been pledged
and what would actually be needed to stay within the 
temperature limits adopted in the Paris Agreement.
Following from that, the parties should commit to increase
the ambition of their NDCs by 2020. The Dialogue could
also send positive messages by highlighting specific regional
or sectoral opportunities for mitigation that also yield 
sustainable development benefits such as clean air or
enhanced energy access. For many countries such broader
sustainable development benefits are at least as important
as the climate benefits of actions; positive interlinkages
should therefore be highlighted and further explored. 
The Dialogue might also put a special spotlight on high 
performers or overachievers in order to help create a 
race to the top.32
8.3 A new captain needed?
Under the Obama administration, the US had been one 
of the key drivers behind the adoption of the Paris
Agreement. While the US under the new Trump adminis-
tration did not actively undermine the process in Bonn to
a great extent, it left a vacuum in leadership which was not
filled by anybody else. The Bonn talks generally exhibited a
low level of energy. Negotiation of implementation rules 
is certainly not as exciting as negotiation of a new treaty,
but it is the implementation rules that will decide whether
Paris actually will have any teeth. At the current pace of the
negotiations, Katowice might become another The Hague,
where negotiations at COP 6 in the year 2000 collapsed 
in a situation that bears certain similarities, with the parties
being unable to agree on the implementation details of 
the Kyoto Protocol.
On the positive side, there are a number of actors and
groups of actors that might evolve to fill the current 
leadership gap effectively. French President Macron seems
intent on donning the mantle of guardian of the Paris
Agreement. He convened the ‘One Planet Summit’ in Paris
shortly after the Bonn COP to create new momentum for
climate protection. The capabilities of France are cur-
rently somewhat stymied as its traditional ally Germany
currently only has a caretaker government in place. There
currently seems little prospect that Germany will adopt 
an ambitious position similar to Macron’s. Nonetheless,
whatever its colour, while the next German government
will probably not be very ambitious in terms of actual 
emission reductions, it can be expected at least to play a
robust role in the diplomatic process.
Another group that has ostensibly donned the mantle
of leadership is the Powering Past Coal Alliance. Its 
membership is an interesting mix of industrialised and
developing countries, of sub-national governments and
business organisations. It remains to be seen whether it will
focus its efforts outside the diplomatic process or also try
to coordinate positions within the UNFCCC.
More directly tied to the UNFCCC process, the
Ministerial Meeting on Climate Action (MOCA) was 
convened by Canada, China and the EU in 2017 in reaction
to the US reversal of position. A first meeting in
September 2017 garnered pledges from most of the 34
attending developed and developing countries to push 
forward with the completion of the Paris rulebook by COP
24. A second meeting is to be convened in 2018.
While not so much in the spotlight at this COP, 
older initiatives also continue to make progress, such as the
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International Solar Alliance led by India and France or the
Africa Renewable Energy Initiative.
Given this plethora of initiatives inside and outside the
UNFCCC, some commentators argue that leadership is 
no longer about one country or a group of countries: 
‘The days when you looked to one country to be able 
to actually lead the transition are gone. We’re now in a
new era, where we are actually seeing more shared 
distributed leadership emerging, where 200 countries 
have collectively contributed to the global effort’.33 In this
optimistic perspective, various countries will take the lead
and contribute to the overall effort in various ways, 
without having one single captain responsible for taking 
the ship safely to port.
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